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Introduction
Writing in Citizenship Studies Weber (2008) suggests the possibility of safe citizenship 
underpinning the task of institutional design. She suggests three different angles to under-
stand citizenship; a Hobbesian, a Foucualdian, and a networked account of citizenship. She 
is clear that her understanding of citizenship reflects legal membership to a community 
that outlines the rights, obligations and a sense of belonging between the individual and the 
community that she or he is a part (Weber 2008, 129). As her discussions of Hobbesian citi-
zenship deepens, she interrogates the possibility of safe citizenship noting that this particular 
understanding of citizenship fails to engage with the problems of allegiance and belonging. 
While scholars of both politics and IR have grappled with these particular problems, I sug-
gest that a turn to affect, drawing on the lived experiences of exile, provides an alternative 
means of attending to such challenges. Affective knowledge, rooted in the lived experiences 
of exiled persons, provides a personal and emotional quality to discussions of citizenship. It 
is a form of subjectivity that displays unique forms of criticality. Such criticality, I suggest, 
can help scholars and activists attend to the trauma of exile, and mobility politics in general.
I draw on Weber’s account of Hobbes in order to challenge cosmopolitan iterations 
of citizenship, envisioning in turn what citizenship, informed by lived experience, might 
become. I question the bounded nature of citizenship that emerges within a state and its 
boundaries. Within these boundaries, I discover two inter-related relationships. The first 
ABSTRACT
Inspired by the idea of safe citizen, articulated by Weber (2008) this 
article queries the possibilities of safety in an age of securitization. It 
challenges the cosmopolitan worldview and its iteration of a global 
cosmopolitan citizen. It champions an account of affective citizenship, 
narration and attends to the trauma of exile. It offers an account of exile 
before suggesting an institutional design premised on politicization. 
This design, it is argued, facilitates moments of storytelling fostering 
individual empowerment. This unorthodox rendering of agency 
allows the traumatized exile to negotiate the world as it is, not as it 
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relationship is that between the government and its people. The second relationship is that 
between the citizens themselves. Safety, if we accept Weber’s suggestions, ought to feature 
in both of these relationships. Yet, I suggest throughout this paper that while we can begin 
to understand a modicum of safety between citizens, it is difficult to envision the sought 
after safety in the relationship between the governed and the government simply because 
it is premised upon the legitimate use of violence, sovereignty and negative liberty. Values, 
I suggest, which inform a particular reading of the securitized state. This article focuses 
on the later relationship in order to attend to the potential for harm and trauma that can 
emerge in the absence of safety, or, I suggest, vulnerable framings of the citizen.
Aware of the various accounts of citizenship (racial, sexual, denationalized, neoliberal, 
flexible, neurotic, bionic and accidental) this paper engages with two interpretations of 
citizenship. It challenges the cosmopolitan agent’s ability to attend to the lived experience 
of the exiled other. It suggests that cosmopolitan citizenship, in its critical iterations fails 
to understand the lack of a voice, or the silence, experienced by the exile. Moreover, it 
identifies a particular role that the cosmopolitan agent, cum universal ethicist, plays in 
furthering this silence. The lived experience of exile is a form of trauma. The fact that the 
cosmopolitan agent contributes to this experience, rather than attending to it in its various 
guises is deeply problematic if, as cosmopolitan scholars suggests, there is a universal vul-
nerability shared amongst a global population that are all equally deserving of the rights 
and obligations outlined by Weber.
One area where this trauma is most overtly evidenced and simultaneously ignored is 
within the practices of migration, and in particular, deportation. Deportation, as Nyers 
(2003) writes, is one of the last domains where states can legitimately display traditional 
forms of sovereign power. It allows the government to overtly display both its legitimate dom-
ination of power and its ability to delivery security to its domestic population. Deportation 
policies frame a discussion that outlines the good democratic citizen while removing those 
from within the state that fail to live up to such expectations. Yet, it is this very act that 
demonstrates just how unsafe citizenship actually is and the precarious power imbalance 
that exists between the state and its domestic population. I suggest this precariousness exists 
because of the wider framing of securitization, discussed in the first and final sections of 
this article. I do not engage in a robust critique of deportation. I touch on it briefly at this 
point to highlight the vulnerability of the citizen vis-a-vis its government in light of the 
criminalization of those that challenge the public good and are, in turn, deported in order 
to enhance the safety of the domestic population.
Overt displays of powers, like deportation, can be traumatic. They can rupture our world-
view rendering the experience incommunicable to a wider audience. Individuals become 
isolated. Such isolation may have a geographical quality, but it can also have a relational 
quality. Both experiences reflect an inability to communicate with others. This is what it is 
to experience trauma. As Edkins (2002) writes, trauma occurs when ‘it involves an exposure 
to an event so shocking to our everyday expectations of how the world works are severely 
disrupted’ (245). Trauma involves a loss of trust, a breakdown of everyday patterns, and an 
inability to make sense of the various worlds we are a part. I argue in this article that exile, 
the counterpoint to citizenship, is a traumatic experience because it does just this. It silences 
the individual, denies them access to the political, and renders their vulnerability explicit. 
Bounded accounts of citizenship, that unfold within in institutional design of the contract, 
like that found in the works of Hobbes, cannot attend to the trauma of the exile because 
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they are designed within a bounded notion of securitization that criminalizes threats and 
situates them outside the status quo. Bounded accounts of citizenship are tied to descriptions 
of the exile as criminal and thus a threat to the public good. They suggest that in order to 
manage our vulnerability the state must be securitized. Securitization enhances the silence 
of trauma. It isolates those deemed criminal and denies the opportunity to tell their stories.
This article seeks out the space within which the exile can tell his or her story. It cham-
pions a narrative methodology in order to emphasize the value of lived experience in the 
construction of an affective account of citizenship. In order to achieve this goal part one 
interrogates the cosmopolitan citizen. It contends that critical iterations of cosmopolitan 
citizenship lack the necessary reflexive capacities needed to engage with the knowledge that 
emerges when stories are told. It moves into affective notions of citizenship to understand 
the origins of trauma and links this trauma to discussions of security and safety. I turn, in 
the second section, to a discussion of exile to demonstrate how it is an isolating experience 
that forecloses discussion and in turn, enhances the experience of trauma. The exilic state 
cannot sustain the necessary working through of the experience if we understand citizen-
ship as bounded, and emerging from within an institutional design of securitization. In 
the third section, I turn to different framings of the political. I suggest, drawing on Edkins 
(2002) that an institutional design premised on politicization offers a glimpse of the type 
of space that affords storytelling a prominent role in the understanding of affective citizen-
ship. Ultimately, this article concludes by demanding a more personal, emotive, form of 
citizenship that welcomes the exile, and the stories they tell, into the political.
Part one: citizenship
Cosmopolitanism should be the appropriate framework to acknowledge a lack of safety 
within IR, and in particular, citizenship. Cosmopolitanism in its ethical, moral and legal 
iterations makes overt claims of a shared human vulnerability. This vulnerability should 
motivate agents to achieve a sense of safety for domestic and international populations in 
their daily lives. Moreover, this vulnerability ought to attend to the problems that emerge 
when citizens’ experiences are marginalized and set outside the political. For example, Lu 
(2009) writes of a world informed by friendship and perpetual peace that eschews univer-
sal claims of personhood. Yet, her writings do not offer any means of achieving a kinder 
world that welcomes the particularities of everyday experiences in a global world. Other 
cosmopolitan scholars have sought to explain this problem. For example, Waldron’s (2000) 
iteration of cosmopolitanism suggests intersecting communities where multiple identities 
emerge and relationships are formed. Yet, this account, while offering an antidote to the 
problems of time, space and distance that are otherwise absent in Lu’s imaginings, still sits 
firmly within bounded accounts of statehood. Lu’s cosmopolitanism, I suggest, demands 
more than a bounded concept of order. Herein, lies its appeal, a call to a future better world. 
Yet, the possibility of a future better world is co-opted, as Hutchings (2014) writes, because 
the cosmopolitan agent, cum universal ethicist, lacks the necessary reflexivity to attend to 
the suffering of others. Such agents cannot grapple with the personal, emotive knowledge 
that can, in Lu’s words, ‘eschew the universal’.
A cursory engagement with critical cosmopolitanism’s iterations of citizenship reveals 
why this is the case. Such scholars suggest that the spread of democratic values will attend to 
the problems of universal vulnerability. Democratic practices, so the story goes, will enhance 
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participation amongst a global population inviting those outside such institutional designs 
into the conversation. Yet, the focus on structural and political change, and the absence of 
reflexive practices, evidenced in such iterations, negates the possibility of listening to such 
voices. For example, Linklater (1998) draws on the dialogical potential of the cosmopolitan 
international citizen to enact structural and political change. He contends that the diaolog-
ical act in and amongst political agents can compel a much needed democratic overhaul 
of various global structures thereby compelling global actors to avoid instances of harm 
(Linklater 2001). Likewise, Benhabib (2004) frames an account of global cosmopolitan citi-
zenship suggesting a democratic iteration which prompts discussion and negotiation among 
agents in order to entrench equality and justice throughout global political structures. 
Both Benhabib and Linklater focus their accounts of citizenship on the assumption of an 
empowered agent who already has a strong and compelling voice to add to the conversation. 
Where, in this conversation, I wonder, is the space for the vulnerable, or perhaps the exile, 
to speak? Moreover, who is listening if they do? I suggest that the empowered agent cannot 
owing to the particular design of the political.
Within the political, the space within which dialogic politics and democratic iterations 
begin, we can begin to find evidence of the underlying norms and values that deny a voice 
to certain segments of the population. The political, drawing on Dallmayr (1996, 196), 
reflects an ethereal space where agents come together and create ‘a constitutive, quasi-tran-
scendental setting or matrix of political life’. It is within this space that the ideals and values 
informing politics emerge. It is to note, as Lang (2002) does, that politics is a highly personal 
endeavour. I draw on such statements in order to propose that the political can be a dynamic 
space that, like Benhabib’s iterations, can contest, challenge and discuss the underlying 
norms and values that inform politics. I am all too aware, however, that such spaces, for 
the most part, reflect an assumed stasis championing universal assumptions of personhood 
that are supported by technical and rational knowledge claims (Beattie and Schick 2012). 
These values emerge from within the social contract tradition, and the writings of Thomas 
Hobbes. It is this framework that sustains the idea of a safe citizen, as discussed by Weber, 
and within which a particular hierarchical relationship between the government and the 
governed emerges.
While the cosmopolitan citizen, in its various incarnations, remains wedded to such 
assumptions, it will remain difficult, if not impossible, to address the particularities of 
human vulnerability. Yet, it is possible to find evidence of an emerging trend focused on the 
particularities of being human. In 2002, Roland Bleiker published his now groundbreaking 
article that suggested an aesthetic approach to international relations. He challenges the 
mimetic practices of IR suggesting an alternative, more personal approach, was needed. The 
influence of his work remains and, in the writings of Solomon (2012) we can find evidence 
of the use of emotional engagements with security discourses of IR as well as the emerging 
discussions of micro politics. An affective, or emotional turn, has much to offer the dis-
courses of citizenship studies and in the works of Isin (2004) we begin to understand the 
point of origin for an affective account of citizenship. Isin’s notion of the neurotic citizen is 
framed in a Foucauldian understanding of power. His work attends to a lack of safety on the 
part of the citizen as he interrogates the desire for those ever present desires of predictability 
and stability within the political. He begins to discuss the idea of insecurity and neuroses 
felt by domestic population in a contemporary age. In his discussions of the neurotic citi-
zen Isin reveals some of the insecurities that arise when domestic subjects are imagined as 
 
5
 
 
 
 
10
 
 
 
 
15
 
 
 
 
20
 
 
 
 
25
 
 
 
 
30
 
 
 
 
35
 
 
 
 
40
 
 
 
 
45
 
 
 
 
AQ3
AQ4
CCST 1132565 
30 December 2015 Initial
CE: TK QA: PK
&ROO;; 4&
CITIZENSHIP STUDIES  5
rational, and unilateral beings, capable of making cost/benefit decisions on a daily basis. 
He suggests that the neurotic citizen emerges at that point when he or she understands the 
tensions that surround the rational renderings of citizenship in the face of the emotional, 
more personable, rendering of the human being.
I am all too aware of this particular challenge. I was ordered deported from the UK 
because my presence in the country was deemed contrary to the public good as described 
by the UK Home Office and Border Agency. I was internally exiled within the UK as I 
fought to stay in the same country as my husband and children, all of whom are British by 
Birth. (I am Canadian). An exile, I soon learned, lacks the traditional recourse to agency 
and cannot participate in the discussions proposed by Linklater and Benhabib. I had to rely 
on others to make my voice heard, yet I had lost the words to describe what I was feeling 
and experiencing. I was living through a traumatic episode that challenged the iterations of 
ethical, moral and philosophical agency and cosmopolitanism that I had encountered, and 
even lectured on, as a scholar of IR (Beattie 2014). While I acknowledge that my experience 
of state deportation was experienced in a supportive and entitled framework, it revealed 
the distance between my own understandings of self, of who I was and what I offered to the 
community, and the way the government understood the idea of me. In short, they did not 
align, and the values of democracy, good citizenship, and participatory government that I 
identified with gave way to a shattered world view. This dissonance, and the absence of any 
effective mode of agency, contributed to a daily sense of insecurity and an ongoing trauma.
According to Isin, this dissonance is the origin of neurosis. Such neurosis can, I suggest, 
tend particular individuals towards traumatic experiences. Unfortunately, such renderings 
of the citizen, as a rational and technical being are difficult to challenge as they are tightly 
interwoven into the contract design of the modern state and the relationship of hierarchy 
and violence that sustain the tradition. This is deeply problematic because an approach 
to design that fosters securitization not only denies the space within which narration can 
emerge, it further entrenches the experience of trauma. Edkins (2002) suggests that for those 
that experience trauma, the turn to securitization heightens the structures that contributed 
to the unfolding trauma in the first place. What is more, for an account of securitization to 
seem to be working there must be a scape goat, or an exile, to blame for the security threat. 
Shildrick (2000) has commented on this phenomenon throughout history noting that in 
the face of threats, fear and insecurity, that which does not align with the status quo is set 
outside the boundaries of the political.
Isin’s neurotic citizen may begin to locate the source of the neuroses. His writings do 
not, however, offer his reader an understanding of what affective citizenship might look 
like. In the writings of Zembylas (2009), an understanding of affective citizenship begins 
to emerge. Like Isin he suggests a turn to the emotional qualities of being human in order 
to understand the identities, individual and communal, that sustain human relationships. 
He suggests that an interrogation of conviviality and hospitality might begin to inform 
an alternative critical pedagogy of citizenship. What Zembylas makes clear is that living 
together is not always comfortable, yet this discomfort need not render the political hos-
tile. It need not tend towards exclusion and exile as the account of securitization requires. 
Rather, he suggests, that the emotional criticality afforded to the affective individual allows 
citizens to attend to the fear of difference and reimagine the relationships of us/them, or 
‘other’ that inform politics. For Zembylas, hospitality and conviviality offer the reader an 
enriched affectivity.
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Zembylas goes much further the Isin in his description of affective citizenship. Before 
such interrogations begin, I suggest that an understanding of the exile might afford some 
insight into the nature of the traumas endured by those who sit outside the peripheries 
of citizenship. Moreover, I wonder if, rather than drawing on theoretical and philosophi-
cal works, a turn towards lived experience might generate a greater understanding of the 
emotional experiences, and trauma of the vulnerable, or indeed, the exile. I suggest that 
an awareness of the lived experience of the individual and the dynamic iterations that 
emerge when individuals engage with one another has a compelling potential to achieve 
a valuable understanding of affective citizenship, especially when such ends are framed 
within an understanding of narrative politics. An appreciation of what it is to be an exile, 
and the ability to listen and reflect on the lived experience of the exile can only begin when 
they are allowed the space to author, and re-author, their own experiences of citizenship, 
or a lack thereof. Such narrative practices, I suggest, enhance the reflexive potential of the 
cosmopolitan agent while simultaneously empowering the exile. They could, potentially, 
open up the required space within the present to attend to the traumas of a vulnerable 
population and heed the calls of Schick (2012). As the ensuing sections reveal, narrative 
politics and the move towards individual empowerment in the face of trauma, present one 
way of imagining an affective account of citizenship.
Part two: exile
Exile is the counterpoint of citizenship. We can understand it from a wide variety of 
 perspectives: historical, political, legal, anthropological or even philosophical. Writing 
in 1983 Shklar interrogates the relationship of political obligation, loyalty, and exile. She 
provides a basic, and helpful, definition. She wonders, ‘What is an exile?’ arguing that ‘An 
exile is someone who voluntarily leaves the country of which he or she is a citizen’ (Shklar 
1983, 187). That being said there are already distinctions and differences to this particular 
definition – in some cases an individual may not leave voluntarily but instead may be forced 
out. Likewise, it might not be an individual who needs to move. Large communities can also 
find themselves exiled from their native lands. Shklar is pragmatic. She notes it is almost 
impossible to generate an exhaustive list of exiled experiences. Consequently, the concept 
of exile is dynamic and evolving. But, at its most blunt, exile demands an understanding 
that for whatever reason one, or many, find themselves alienated and outside the formal 
boundaries of ‘the political’.
An exiled being, while denied access to the political, may still live out their daily lives 
within its confines. Shklar points out that some individuals may be internally exiled, in 
essence, a non-territorial form of exile.
Official illegality may also create a non-territorial form of exile, internal exclusion from 
citizenship, which affects slaves, unwelcome immigrants and ethnic groups, and morally 
upright people trapped within the borders of tyrannical states. The excluded, or internal 
exiles as they have sometimes been called, even sometimes appear in constitutional regimes 
on those occasions when these engage in exceptionally unjust and immoral policies. The 
morally isolated individual may be reduced to living in accordance with no rule other than 
his private conscience, and I shall try to say something about the arguments that such 
people make, as part of my review of the obligations and loyalties to excluded persons. 
(Shklar 1983, 190)
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Shklar’s essay is interesting on multiple fronts. She is clear that political theory, in 1992, 
had not paid much attention to the idea of the exile, or his or her plight. But following on 
from this claim she wonders if the plight of the exile is any more special then the plight of 
others who decide whether or not to obey the state and its laws. The different lies in the 
reaction to unjust laws, deciding ultimately if such laws can be changed or if policies are, in 
her words, ‘manifestly unjust’ (Shklar 1983, 193). The different, I believe, is for those who 
find themselves in exile with no community to support them there is nowhere to go. Shklar 
notes this point. It is one thing to be an internal exile fighting to achieve institutional change 
(if you disagree with a political policy). It is another thing to lack empowerment and be 
unable to leave a country or fight for change, in the absence of representation. Finally, it is 
another situation altogether when you leave the state that persecutes you and it continues 
on an overt path of aggression be it at an individual or communal level.
At the end of the day, the exile has nowhere to go. If they must leave their state, they rely 
on the goodwill of another to allow them entry, and if they cannot leave, they require the 
help of an empowered agent to achieve institutional change that may not address the orig-
inal vulnerability that lead to their internal exile. In essence, the structures of the political 
generate dependency while at the same time foreclosing the possibility of reflection and 
listening. We simply cannot be, we must do, but what we do is a highly scripted engagement 
of conformity, acceptance, and denial as it relates to promoting state security at the cost of 
human representation.
Said (2001) provides an alternative, but no less interesting, departure for discussions of 
exile. Exile, he writes, ‘is a condition legislated to deny dignity-to deny an identity to people’ 
(Said 2001, 139). He speaks of the role of nationalism in the quotidian, constructed as an 
antidote to the experience of exile. ‘Nationalism is an assertion of belonging in and to a place, 
a people, a heritage’, he writes. ‘It affirms the home created by a community of language, 
culture and customs; and, by so doing, it fends off exile, fights to prevent its ravages’ (Said 
2001, 139). While nationalism is experienced in common exile is assumed to be a solitary 
experience that occurs outside the community. It draws on the historical antecedent of 
banishment, the ultimate punishment.
Said stresses the negative side of exile. To be alone and to be outside, he wonders, does it 
create a sense and need to belong? He wonders if the experience of exile helps in creating a 
hyper-nationalism to overcome the insecurity and jealousy that can surface in the absence 
of solidarity. He writes that exile is a jealous state. It is also, he writes, a state of resentment.
Exiles look at non-exile with resentment. They belong in their surroundings, you feel, whereas 
an exile is always out of place. What is it role to be born in a place, to say and live there, to 
know that you are of it, more or less forever? (Said 2001, 139)
Said distinguishes categories of exile drawing a line in the experiences of those he labels 
refugees and those expatriates who he associates with an intellectual lifestyle born out in 
choice and not in the absence of agency. While refugees connote a political and historical 
problem, the need for assistance in the face of innocent rupture and bewilderment, an 
exile and his or her experience, according to Said is both solitary and spiritual. But within 
this distinction Said notes that exile is an alternative mode of being political that stands in 
contradistinction from the state.
Exile is not, after all, a matter of choice: you are born into it, or it happens to you. But, provided 
that the exile refuses to sit on the sidelines nursing a wound, there are things to be learned; he 
or she must cultivate a scrupulous (not indulgent or sulky) subjectivity. (146–147)
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In this way we can begin to envision how an exile might inform an affective account of 
citizenship. The exile enjoys a subjective positioning that allows them to query to status 
quo, to wonder, in the absence of key political relations, if the institutional design, alluded 
to by Weber (2008) can provide the necessary safety and security envisioned within a lib-
eral, international, world order. He or she is able to do so aware of the emotional impact 
of feeling unwanted, of being that other. It highlights the emotional impact of hostility and 
fear discussed by Zembylas.
Said (2001) turns to Adorno to show this exact point. In Adorno we see exile as the 
means of interrogating the nature of the world ‘as it is’. For Said, Adorno reflects a world-
view that acknowledges the contingent nature of the world and the provisional nature of 
security and its constructs. ‘Borders and barriers’, he writes, ‘which enclose us within the 
safety of familiar territory, can also become prisons, and are often defended beyond reason 
or necessity. Exiles cross border, break barriers of thought and experience’ (Said 2001, 147). 
Yet, this very act, of intervention if you will, is silenced for fear of rupturing the fragile act 
of securitization. The exile, removed from the political, highlights the precarious position 
of the citizen vis-a-vis the government. In revealing the permeable nature of boundaries 
and borders, and the impossibility of complete safety the citizen is vulnerable. They are 
vulnerable because, if they are found wanting, they are criminalized and removed in a bid 
to acquire a modicum of safety.
Shklar (1983) and Said (2001) both reflect on the silencing of the exile. This silencing, I 
suggest, is the way in which the state, as legitimate wielder of violence, forecloses any pos-
sibility of vulnerability and insecurity. As Shildrick (2000) has demonstrated in her work 
individuals who do not align with the status quo, or force questions relating to categories 
of belonging within the political, are silenced. Such silencing is produced through the erec-
tion of a cordon sanitaire that hyper-securitizes the status quo label of the in group, while 
maligning the threat of the outsider. For example, she notes, in ancient history, how the 
image of the feminine was denied access to the political and forbidden from participating 
in public life, simply due to the dominance of the masculine. She traces this unfolding 
separation not only through the treatment of disabled throughout history, but also at the 
contemporary example of the HIV/AIDS hysteria in the 1980s when to be homosexual 
was to stand outside the status quo. It speaks to the problematic nature of boundaries, and 
borders, within any construction of the political and the complicit role they play in security 
provision premised on infallibility and a lack of vulnerability.
This separation as silencing indicates a problem with boundaries and labels. It suggests 
a faith in the permanence of human creations and a lack of awareness of their dynamic 
nature. It is also, I suggest, a silencing that denies the ability of the agent to develop, to 
be a genuine person. I wonder if this is what Said was attending to when he argued that 
exile is an undignified experience. In short, silencing denies traditional forms of agency 
premised on a relational account of the political. It denies the expression of the self within 
the political, and does not engender the safety of citizenship alluded to by Weber (2008). 
It is a silencing enacted by the state as it seeks permanent secure structures in a dynamic 
and changing account of the political. This silencing is a form of exile. It exiles the person 
from a secure state of being and denies the possibility of development on the part of the 
person as an autonomous and creative force. It highlights the problematics of a state/indi-
vidual relationship premised on violence and sovereignty as articulated by Weber (2008). I 
propose it is indicative of one way that a liberal world view maintains its hierarchical and 
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universal institutional design. In short, exile is the overt controlling of individuals whose 
life experiences and subjectivity call the status quo into question.
In her 1996 fieldwork in Rwanda and Burundi, Lissa Malkki provides compelling evi-
dence of this type of silencing in her accounting of the liberal humanitarian development 
regime. As she was listening to those living in exile it became apparent to her that the stories 
of who they were, as people, the notion of identity, and personality, did not fit within the 
defined categories of expected and accepted knowledge. When discussing this phenom-
enon with the aid workers on site, she was quick to learn that this phenomenon was an 
accepted reality, one that she struggled to comprehend. In the end, she wrote about this 
exact phenomenon labelling the experience of denied personhood one of corporeal ano-
nymity. Herein, lies her parallel with Said (2001). In essence, to live in exile is to be unable 
to engage as a whole person. The structures that guide international politics; namely the 
human rights regime, a subsidiary of the universal rights project, demands one particular 
notion of being human; namely, a rights bearing subject. To enhance, or even challenge, 
this image is to render the larger story problematic and reveal the inherent vulnerability of 
being human and the ensuing narrative that each and every person can, if allowed, author.
Exile, I suggest is a symptom of the underlying relationship of violence and power 
described by Weber and discussed in the Introduction of this article. It suggests the effec-
tive management of the relationships that guide the daily interactions of human beings and 
their government. What it does not attend to is the relationship of the powerful over the 
un-empowered. Here, I am suggesting that in the relationship of citizen and government 
it is the later that holds the power and is able to dictate the relationship between the two. 
This power imbalance is not limited to the various framings of citizenship discussed by 
Weber (2008). It is likewise evident in cosmopolitan framings of moral agency. I suggest that 
until such a time that this particular relationship is unpacked and there is a space for the 
exiled to author their story, on their own terms, in a safe political structure, it will remain 
impossible to truly work through the trauma of exile in a way that renders the individual 
within, or outwith, the state truly safe.
Trauma and the institutional design of exile
How might we begin to make sense of this need to exile and begin to work through trauma? 
I turn to the writings of Edkins (2002) who offer an alternative means of being political in 
order to interrogate this claim. Writing in the aftermath of 9/11 Edkins interrogates the 
decision by the American Government to enact a series of policies that reified boundaries 
of us and them, create a series of boundaries that reinforced the promotion of anarchy and 
survival within the international and failed to attend to the opportunities for alternative 
institutional design. Edkins is highly critical of this political framework. She notes how 
such an approach cannot attend to the vulnerabilities of being human. In fact, the turn 
to securitization, is precisely done to avoid such discussions altogether. Vulnerability is 
denied by a call to arms, quite literally, the use of military prowess in order to safeguard 
the well-being of the domestic population in times of uncertainty.
The enactment of exile is, I suggest, a direct response to the uncertainty posed by mobile 
peoples that challenge boundaries within the political. The institutional design of securiti-
zation, at the outset, assumes human stasis. Anyone who challenges this assumption and 
migrates beyond his or her original state is considered out of the ordinary. Writing on the 
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problems of human stasis, and complimenting her work on corporeal anonymity, Malkki 
(1995) probes this very assumption and argues that mobile peoples, either forced or volun-
tary, are considered pathologically ill. The underlying assumption of order, Malkki contends, 
is that individuals remain in the same place for their whole life and it is the geographical 
location, and the relational elements it promotes, that provide a moral education. People 
who are seen to leave this environment cannot acquire the necessary moral knowledge to 
be good citizens, either domestic or international. It is necessary to curtail their action, 
interrogate their entire subjectivity, prior to potentially admitting them into the community.
When the arguments of Malkki (1995, 1996) are situated alongside the critique of 
 securitization offered by Edkins (2002), some interesting ideas emerge. Edkins highlights 
the inherent insecurity of a securitised regime that fails to overtly tackle the problems of 
instability cum vulnerability. One way to attain this level of sought after predictability is 
to establish boundaries that demarcate who is, and who is not, a legitimate citizen. This, I 
suggest, leads to situations of exile, both internal and external alike. This exilic state not only 
stands in direct opposition to the underlying assumptions of a cosmopolitan worldview, it 
is a direct challenge to the agent, cum global citizen, ability to affect change. In essence, it 
denies the space where stories can be told, or re-authored. It is focused on a future better 
world and cannot provide the space for the exile to work towards a particular form of 
empowerment. How might we begin to envision such a space that goes beyond the named 
safety of Weber (2008) that does not rely on the universal cosmopolitan ethicist or agent 
that cannot attend to the particularities of trauma?
Once again the writings of Edkins (2002) are exceptionally helpful. At the opposite end 
of a securitization approach rests the notion of politicization. She proposes to her readers 
that the ensuing quiet, both psychical and aesthetic, of 9/11 offers an alternative for insti-
tutional design. A design which, I contend could sustain the desires of safe citizenship 
proposed by Weber, because it allows us, as human beings, to admit, engage, and work 
through a shared vulnerability within the community. Politicisation demands that agents 
be attuned to the quiet that emerges in situations of trauma and insecurity. It seeks out the 
human, the relationships that can prompt action of an altogether different sort. Such acts 
seek reconciliation, prompt communication that fosters understanding, and imagine the 
possibility of unity and not separation.
Politicisation offers an alternative to the teleological orientation of a cosmopolitan world-
view. It is attuned to the present and does not focus the ends of agency understood as a 
future sought after, and at times elusive, end goal. Politicisation situates the agent within the 
daily framework of unfolding events aware of the vulnerabilities associated with a relational 
ontology. It allows for unpredictability, creativity and a dynamic human nature that engages 
with otherwise previously unknown outcomes that can be simultaneously positive and 
negative alike. This, I suggest, is a subjectivity that does not accommodate a cosmopolitan 
ethic or moral agent, but is one account of being human that fosters politicization. The 
temporality of policization attends to the dislocation of the exile. Moreover, it suggests a 
thoughtful working through of trauma like that hinted at within Isin’s notion of neuroses. It 
recognizes the creative potential of a subjective critique of the status quo discussed by Said 
(2001). Likewise it understands the powerful drive of quiet and the unique opportunity it 
presents to the exile to recreate themselves, and the worlds in which they are a part.
This creative tendency within politicisation facilitates an alternative form of human agency. 
It is an account focused on empowerment not social or political change. This is an absent, but 
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much needed discussion that emerges at the intersection of citizenship discourses and insti-
tutional design that engages with the challenges of exile. Traditional forms of agency suggest 
empowered individuals (MacIntyre 1999; O’Neill 2001) that engage with institutional design 
(Erskine 2000) or, focus on states as the primary agents of IR (Wendt 1994). The exile, on the 
other hand, is unable to access the political. Thus while he or she can reason and deliberate, 
their ability to affect change as articulated by O’Neill or MacIntyre is impossible. Likewise, 
any institutional change, as suggested by Erskine rendered impossible. The exile lacks that 
teleological quality assumed within a cosmopolitan ethic. Consequently their lived experience 
reflects the realities of dislocation, separation and loss. The exile must work within this story 
and, as Said has proposed, cultivate a scrupulous subjectivity (2001). I suggest that we, as 
scholars, ought to champion a narrative framework to citizenship and draw on the emerging 
methods of autobiography and autoethnography, in order to generate the space for the exile 
subject, or solitary agent, to embark upon such a task.1 There is a space within storytelling 
that affords the exile the opportunity to work towards a form of personal empowerment.
I suggest that storytelling is that particular act that brings together the notion of trau-
matic exile, discussed in the introduction of this article, the possibilities of an institutional 
design premised on politicisation as proposed by Edkins (2002) and the ability to frankly 
and openly discuss exile within the political. If exile, as I contend, is a traumatic rendering 
of the individual subject, and is a product of an abusive and violent relationship between 
the government and the governed, there is a need for such individuals to tell their stories, 
in essence, to reclaim back their personhood and their identity in the face of securitization. 
Storytelling, understood as a form of therapy, may in fact provide such an instance. If we 
turn to the works of Crossley (2000) we can begin to see how important storytelling, as 
a form of empowered agency, nay therapy, may prompt alternative understandings of the 
worlds of which we are a part. It attends to the insecurity that follows on from a traumatic 
episode and allows individuals to reimagine both their subjectivity and positionality in the 
world aware of an ever-present ontological vulnerability.
Crossley (2002) situates her account of therapy within the works of Carr (1986), who sug-
gests temporal and spatial parallels in the lived experience of traumatized subjects and the 
unfolding narratives of fiction. He argues on behalf of a relational account of human action 
which, I suggest, has implications for how we think through not only individual subjectiv-
ity and identity formation, but any form of agency that ensues. The works of Crossley are 
important because they show, very simply, the mirroring of lived experience and narrative 
and how that plays out within therapy.
Literary stories such as fiction and autobiography do not in any sense ‘impose’ a structure and 
order on human action and life. Instead, they tend to reinforce and make more explicit the 
symbolisation that is already at work within a culture at the level of practical human action. 
The function of narratives such as autobiographies, then, is simply to reveal structures or 
meanings that previously remained implicit or unrecognised, and thus to transform life and 
elevate it to another level. (2000, 537)
Storytelling does two things. It allows individuals to negotiate the vulnerability of trauma. 
Individuals can reconcile the traumatic events that have unfolded while simultaneously 
reenvisaging their role in the world. Here, the distinction between world and the political 
is important. Storytelling, and the ensuing empowerment that can occur during this pro-
cess, need not happen within the relational structure of the political, what it does allow for 
is a reimaging of the individual and their abilities, aware of their particular temporal and 
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spatial displacement. Empowerment, the second aspect of storytelling, is achieved simply 
by reconstructing the human narrative that assigns renewed understanding and acceptance 
in the face of the labelling imposed on the self, by others. In essence the subject is recreating 
the relationships that sustain their sense of personhood but doing so in such a way that does 
not reinsert them into the world as it was, hoping for a better future. Instead, this form of 
empowerment allows the agent to develop an inner strength that enables them to take on 
the world as it is. In essence, storytelling as agency reflects the temporality of politicisation 
and not the cosmopolitan ethic emerging within a securitized institutional design.
As I read through Weber’s notion of safe design, I find a synergy within its hopeful 
future to the teleological assumptions of a cosmopolitan ethic. The notion of a ‘safe’ insti-
tutional design mirrors, in subtle ways, the idea of a better future world. But in focusing 
on the creation of the future better, we forget about the harmful present, a point well noted 
and reflected upon by Schick (2009). Imagining the benefits of Adorno’s work on ethical 
international relations Schick reminds scholars and practitioners alike of the attendant 
harm that comes when the immediate present is overshadowed by future potential design. 
She poignantly argues on behalf of the concrete other of the universal rights project so 
central to ethical discourses of IR and suggests that only when harm is negotiated in the 
present, and the traumatized subject is given recourse to negotiate this harm on their own 
terms, can ethical encounters within the international begin to realistically grapple with 
the outcomes of trauma. For we must recall, as was made clear in the introduction of this 
article that trauma is idiosyncratic and so to must the recourse to trauma be multivariate 
and personal. Cosmopolitanism, in its universal, technical cum rational approach to the 
world, cannot accommodate this much-needed personableness.
There is no universal approach to rectifying harm and suffering and so, to fully mediate its 
unfolding and its impact, securitization as an approach to institutional design must be aban-
doned. It must be abandoned because it cannot accommodate the inherent vulnerability of 
being human, a vulnerability that sits at the core of trauma. Yet, this vulnerability has always, in 
the ethical discourses of IR, been something to avoid rather than embrace. An account of agency 
that rests upon storytelling, of finding one’s place within the world, embraces this vulnerability 
and thus poses questions for the institutional designs of Linklater and Benhabib. Likewise it 
pushes us to go beyond the safety desired by Weber, but facilitates a thoughtful understanding 
of the affective citizen. It asks us to recognize individuals, as they truly are, not subjects, but 
persons with stories, histories and identities that enrich the various worlds of which they are 
part. It suggests how scholars can begin to imagine the lived experience of affective citizenship.
Conclusion
This article was inspired by the ideas of Weber (2008) and her desire to frame an account 
of citizenship that is safe. Normative ethical discourses of International Relations, in par-
ticular Cosmopolitanism, envision how this safety might come about, if it is understood as 
a protection from suffering, and an access to the basic rights of security and subsistence, 
by all members of a global population. Yet, as this article has stressed, cosmopolitanism, in 
its various guises, while focused on the vulnerable subject, has been unable to attend to the 
emerging harms evident within an institutional design that adopts the ideas of securitization.
This article suggests an engagement with the idea of politicization outlined by Edkins. 
Such a framing of International Relations provides the requisites space within which to 
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understand the possibilities of affective citizenship and what this might mean for empow-
erment of exiled individuals. As Zembylas (2009) has suggested in his engagement with 
affective citizenship education emotional relationships sustain both individual and com-
munal identities. This type of knowledge can, and does emerge, when stories are authored 
and re-authored and the lived experience of the exile is allowed to come through. Yet, such 
stories will only emerge in an institutional design that challenges the need to securitize the 
state in the face of otherness.
Until such a time arrives when the ends of politicization are realized, individuals must 
negotiate the world as it is. It is only very recently that a turn to micro-politics has shifted 
the focus of IR scholars allowing the aesthetics turn in IR to deepen its understanding of 
the individual affective experience. It remains a peripheral area of study and thus opens to 
criticism. Indeed, many scholars of IR would suggest a focus on storytelling as empowerment 
is not needed if, by nature, the focus of the discipline is the state. Indeed, safe accounts of 
citizenship reify the state as primary actor within bounded accounts of citizenship. Likewise, 
scholars engaged in the task of institutional design will possibly struggle to align the tempo-
ral needs of institutional change with the non-linear renderings of traumatic experiences. As 
Schick has suggested it is easier to pass over traumatic pasts in order to attend to a possible 
better future. Consequently, scholars engaged with moral and ethical accounts of agency 
may struggle with an individual focus on agency that addresses the idiosyncratic nature of 
trauma rather than a universal scripted engagement with exiled others.
Storytelling is an unorthodox form of agency. It empowers individuals in the face of 
inequality and injustice. As a method of therapy storytelling can help the individual reinsert 
him or herself in the world aware of its precarious and unpredictable nature. Storytelling, as 
autobiography, Inayatullah (2010) suggests, reveals the structures and institutions that frame 
our everyday experience. He also notes, much like Crossley (2000) that such revelations 
disclose affinities and dissonance within the stories of others. In this way, storying is part 
of affective citizenship. As Zembylas has suggests it informs an understanding of how best 
to live with others in a complicated and unpredictable world. This is part of the narrative 
process, or storytelling. As Crossely notes, this process allows individuals to reconnect with 
the relationships that matter, and helps individuals to make sense of the worlds they are a 
part. In this way, individuals can find a sense of inner security, despite the labels, boundaries 
and projections that are associated with the exilic state. Consequently, the exiled storyteller 
can imagine alternative subjectivities that understanding that status quo while simultane-
ously reimaging the particular form it takes in their daily lives.
Note
1.  This methodological approach is only now emerging in International Relations and does 
remain on the peripheries of the discipline. For a cursory overview of this approach see 
the writings of: Dauphinee (2010, 2013), Doty (2004, 2010), Neumann (2010), and finally, 
Inayatullah (2010).
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